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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

TROY LABRUM,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 970099-CA
Priority No. 2
:

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-2 03.1 provides:
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
-- Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used
in this section means the defendant and two or more
other persons would be criminally liable for the
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2)
(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases
or the information or indictment in felony cases
notice that the defendant
is subject to the
enhanced penalties provided under this section.
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and
in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b)
If
the
subscription
is
not
included
initially, the court may subsequently allow the
prosecutor to amend the charging document to
include the subscription if the court finds the
charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of
the allegation he committed the offense in concert
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the
defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3)
The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90
consecutive
days
in a jail
or other
secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 180

consecutive days in a
correctional facility.

jail

or

other

secure

(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter
37,
37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding
drug-related
offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in
Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6,
Part
5,
except
Sections
76-6-503,
76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510,
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516,
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;
(I)
any
offense
of
obstructing
government
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8,
except
Sections
76-8-302,
76-8-303,
76-8-304,
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation
of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 3;

2

(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76 Chapter : 10, Part
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
In) communications fraud as defined i n Section
76-10-18 0] ;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction
Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in
Section 76-10-2002.
(5)
(a* This section does not. create any separate
offense but provides =»;: enhanced penalty for the
primary offense,
(b* . \ ".- • :rposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons with
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified,
apprehended,
charged, or
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section. The imposition of the penalty
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing
judge
that
this
section
is applicable.
In
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written
findings
of
fact
concerning
the
applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution
of the sentence required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be
best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying
the disposition on the record and :i n writing.

Ut " u '" "
7

-

" / 6 - 2 - 2 0 2 (1 9 9 5 ) j: •] < :> < ri des ; :

-202. Criminal responsibility for direct
commission of offense or for conduct of a

Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
3

encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

The fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of las; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
4

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
proi n des :
Sec, 12.

[Rights of accused persons,]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused, person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to
a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing In this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute ^-r rule.

Article I, section 3 3 of the Utah Constitution..
provides:
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment -Grand j ury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment
The formation of the grand
5

jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE
BACK SEAT PASSENGER COMMITTED ANY CRIME TO
SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT
HERE.
The State has established the following:
1.

That Mr. Behunin was in the house where

he, Mr. Labrum, Joe Kelly, and Kevin McCray resided, 15
to 20 feet away from a conversation, when Mr. Mills and
Mr. Labrum asked Joe Kelly if they could borrow his car
to "go shoot somebody."

This conversation was audible

at a distance of "no more than ten feet" where Mr.
McCray was standing, but there is no evidence that it
was audible at 15 to 2 0 feet, that Mr. Behunin was
paying attention to the conversation, or that Mr.
Behunin heard the conversation.
2.

R. 285-8.

That Mr. Behunin left with Mr. Mills and

Mr. Labrum some hour and a half later.
3.

R. 288, 289.

That Mr. Behunin was with Mr. Mills and

Mr. Labrum at the time of the shooting.
6

R. 211.

S e c t i o n 76-2-202 p r o v i d e s that a p e r s o n w h o "directly
c o m m i t s t h e o f f e n s e , w h o s-~"!:c^4 •"

requests, commands,
=

encourages

.^r nerson to engage in

conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as - r-arty for such conduct . "
<

" j.ici .1 I

1 HI:

-

The State has shown no crimi na]

~ i .

It is undisputed tnat v :. Behunin did not directly
commit the offense,

L:-brum was charged with ana cor/;;

~gg- " -:-^

be_:.-.

sentencing that

-

Aate produced no evidence at z:..^.

or

behunin solicited, requested, commanded, or

encouraqed - h*7 shooting

The State has only shown

alonj

.... • . .ie, proi>a^-/ without knowledge or :ne planned

shooting

i.\----. . ; :•.

Behunin was aware 01 the plan, being aware

of d planned offense is nc *" •= ~

-.; - •:

person to " ..a::, .. .tv under

«... *A/^. .

Final.../, v-

- 1

Behunin did not aia

backseat: passenoei was entirely
did nc:::::.;

f

,: ;.- -^---.~5>-

lookout was needed;

' -:he r ffense.
* -

— ..^c^

The
^nd

evidence indicated that

Mr. Behunm wa- acting as a lookout.

No evidence indicates that

Mr. Behunin selected the target

" jiinti.-i, LLL i . dl.'u.ih >r

' 'i

otherwise assisted i n the shooting,

AJ 1 thai has been shown is

passive presence.
"Mere presence, or even ri'-i

-

one an accomplice when he neither aa;.j«..-

VT
.stigates,

encourages, 01 assists in perpetration of the crime "
Kerekes , 622 P 2 d I! 3 61

State v.

] 3 6 6 (IJt a h ] 9 8 0 ) (c j j: inq State v. G e e ,
7

498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972));

accord State v. Ferticr, 233 P.2d 347,

349 (Utah 1951) ("Mere presence combined with knowledge that a
crime is about to be committed or a mental approbation while the
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act, will not of
itself constitute one an accomplice.").

See Ybarra v. Illinois,

444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (A
"person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable
cause to search that person."),

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,

51-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (mere presence
in a neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion);

United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581,

593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) ("Presumptions of
guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings.");
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable
suspicion where man walking near defendant had run away).
The State seeks to infer both the actus
mens

rea

reus

and the

of a criminal act by Mr. Behunin from his association

with others and mere presence at the scene of a crime.

But

entire criminal acts may not be inferred from association with
criminals.

The evidence to support imposition of the gang

enhancement is insufficient, as no showing has been made that a
third person "would be criminally liable for the offense" as a
party under §76-2-202.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (b) .

Evidence that Mr. Behunin may have been staring or
flashing gang signs does not establish a crime.
8

Staring and gang

signs are not necessary precursors to a drive by shooting or
attempted homicide.

After the fact "gloating," R. 302, does not

constitute a crime.

Millions celebrated the death of Adolf

Hitler, but this does not make them criminally responsible for
his death.

The State relies only on Mr. Behunin's presence and

his association with Messrs. Mills and Labrum to show that he
might have committed a crime for which the State has no evidence.
"Arguing, as the State does, that speculative inferences can
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of
the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its core."

State v.

Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993).
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence
is well settled:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant
must cover the gap between the presumption of innocence
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to
review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does
not mean that the court can take a speculative leap
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State in re J.S.H., 642 P.2d 386
(Utah 1982); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240
(Utah 1980).
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-5 (Utah 1983).

The fabric

here is stretched so thin, and is so full of holes, that it could
not serve as a dishrag.

There is no evidence establishing

criminal conduct by Mr. Behunin.
The facts of Petree are illustrative.

The body of a

teenaged girl was found in an unusual position in a shallow grave
9

in Cedar City, together with her clothing, jewelry, and a pair of
boxer shorts.

659 P.2d at 444.

Defendant, a neighbor, was the

last person seen with the victim.

Id. at 445.

Several hours

after dropping the victim off, her mother inquired of defendant
where she was and he replied that she left with someone he did
not know.

Id.

The evening the victim disappeared, defendant

called his sister in Las Vegas saying "'he was getting a hassle
at home and in school and he wanted to come down.'"
sister went to Cedar City and picked him up.

Id.

His

Id. at 44 9.

Defendant stayed with his sister in Las Vegas for four days.
at 445.

Id.

While there, defendant told his sister of a "nightmare

about walking with a girl and she slapped him and that's all he
remembered, and then waking up taking a bath and her folks, the
girl's folks pounding on the door wanting to know where she was."
Id.

"'Later he said he thought he had hurt or killed a girl, but

he wasn't sure.'"

Id. at 446.

More than two years later,

defendant mentioned to a girlfriend that "he had gotten into a
fight with a girl in Utah.

He didn't mention any names.

came home and he couldn't remember nothing afterwards."
447 & n.4.

And he
Id. at

The Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to

establish that defendant killed the victim, or that he did so
intentionally or knowingly.
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), a
search warrant was executed against the home of a husband and
wife, yielding 4 marijuana plants, two paper bags containing
marijuana and hashish, and sundry other items.
10

The husband

stated, "My wife doesn't know anything about this.
home with everything."

I just came

State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1259

(Utah 1983).
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the wife
for insufficient evidence:
[T] he facts as stipulated in this case n consist of a
confirmation that the defendants owned and resided in
the house where the warrant search was made, a list of
the items found in that search, most of which were
enclosed in two brown paper bags, and the statement
made by defendant Carl Anderton that his wife knew
nothing about the drugs and that he had just returned
home with them. The only other relevant evidence in
the record consists of testimony regarding the amounts
of marijuana and hashish generally kept by an
individual for personal use.[] There is no evidence as
to where in the home the drugs were found or where the
defendant Lana Anderton was when the officers entered
the house. Moreover, there is no evidence of any
incriminating conduct or statements of Lana Anderton.
Thus, there is nothing which establishes that the drugs
were in her view, accessible or even close to her, or
that she was participating in the use of the drugs or
knew of their presence in the house.
Similarly, there is no evidence in the record
which shows Lana Anderton's knowing or intentional
involvement in the production of marijuana. The only
evidence is that of joint residence in the home where
the plants were found; there is nothing to establish
how long the plants had been there or where they were
found.
When the facts of this case are considered,
particularly in light of the cases cited above, it
requires a "leap of faith" to find that Lana Anderton
is guilty solely on the basis of her marital
relationship with her husband and their joint occupancy
of the home.
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264-5 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J.,
joined by Stewart and Howe, JJ). So here, Mr. Behunin cannot be
found criminally responsible merely because he lived with
appellant and was present in the car at the time of the crime.

11

The evidence here is not even as strong as that in
Petree and Anderton, and establishes at most only probable cause.
"A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt."
(Utah 1993) .

State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985

The State relies on nothing more here.

The gang

enhancement sentence must be vacated.

POINT II. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE
OFFENSE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS ACCORDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS.
(Responding to State's brief at Point II.B., pp.
14-22)
A.

RAMIREZ DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES
RAISED HERE.

On November 14, 1997, this Court issued its opinion in
State v. Ramirez, 330 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah App. 1997)
(Wilkins, A.P.J., joined by Davis, P.J., and Jackson, J . ) .
Ramirez addressed whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 violated a
defendant's right to trial by jury under the sixth amendment.

In

a footnote this Court clarified:
We address only the narrow question of whether
requiring the sentencing judge to make the factual
determination required by section 76-3-203.1 violates
the Sixth Amendment. We do not address the general
application of the statute.
330 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21 n.5.

While related, the sixth amendment

challenge made in Ramirez is distinct from the challenges made
here:

(1) that the gang enhancement statute exceeds the

permissible bounds of offense definition under the due process
12

clauses of the state and federal constitutions;

(2) that the

statute violates substantive due process, federal equal
protection, and state uniform operation of laws because it is not
applied in accordance with its legislative intent; and (3) that
the statute is void for vagueness under the due process clauses
because it does not adequately constrain judicial discretion and
require judges to apply the enhancement only to criminal street
gang members.
This Court should also note, as set forth in the
State's brief at p. 14-15 n.8, these constitutional challenges
are currently pending before the Supreme Court in State v.
Cameron Lopes, No. 960551 (Utah, argued Nov. 12, 1997).

B.

IN CONCERT ACTIVITY IS DEFINED AS THE
SEPARATE OFFENSE OF CONSPIRACY UNDER
UTAH LAW.

The State asserts that "the Utah legislature did not
define acting in concert as a separate offense."
at 17.

This is not so.

State's brief

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995),

enacted by 1973 Utah Laws ch. 196, sets forth the elements of
conspiracy.1

In any case where a gang enhancement is sought, the

State could instead charge the defendant with the underlying
offense and conspiracy.

In such a situation, the defendant would

be entitled to a preliminary hearing and a jury would make the

x

One notable difference between conspiracy and the gang
enhancement is that a conspiracy conviction requires only one coconspirator, whereas application of the gang enhancement requires
two additional in-concert actors.
13

determination of guilt.

Upon conviction, a separate sentence

would be imposed.
Of particular note is that, in addition to losing all
of the constitutional protections attendant to a criminal
prosecution for conspiracy (e.g. preliminary hearing, jury
determination, application of evidentiary rules), the defendant
receives a stiffer sentence under the gang enhancement than under
a conviction for both the offense and conspiracy to commit the
offense.

Utah's sentencing guidelines set forth the presumptive

term of incarceration under Utah's indeterminate sentencing
system.

See Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Utah Court

Rules Annotated at Appendix D (p. 1303 et seg.).

Here, if Mr.

Labrum had been convicted of both attempted homicide and
conspiracy to commit murder, he would have received two 1 to 15
year sentences.2

In the worst case scenario of on offender in

the poor criminal history category, applied consecutively the
second sentence would add 18 months to his presumptive sentence
of 36 months for a total of 4% years.

In the best case scenario

of an offender in the excellent criminal history category,
applied concurrently the second sentence would add 9 months to
his presumptive sentence of 18 months for a total of 2V* years.
See Sentence and Release Guidelines, Form 4 (attached as Appendix
2

In the normal case, conspiracy to commit the underlying
offense would be a felony of a lower degree than the underlying
offense.
For example, if a person were convicted of murder and
conspiracy to commit murder, he or she would have a first and
second degree conviction, rather than two first degree convictions.
Here, Mr. Labrum was only convicted of attempted homicide, thus the
conspiracy offense is a felony of the same degree.
14

A).

Under the gang enhancement, the minimum term is increased to

6 years, significantly longer than even the worst case scenario
for a consecutive conspiracy conviction.

Similar results occur

for application of the gang enhancement in 1st degree and 3rd
degree felony cases.
The gang enhancement raises more than "the specter of
states restructuring crimes to avoid constitutional procedural
safeguards," State's brief at 19; it is the physical embodiment
of an actual restructuring specifically designed to avoid the
constitutionally imposed procedural safeguards inherent in
conspiracy prosecutions.

POINT III. APPELLANT'S UNIFORM OPERATION,
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
ARGUMENTS ARE MERITORIOUS.
(Responding to State's brief at Point III, pp. 2330)
A.

MR. LABRUM HAS STANDING TO ASSERT HIS
CLAIMS THAT THE GANG ENHANCEMENT APPLIES
TO PERSONS THE LEGISLATURE NEVER
INTENDED TO TARGET.

The State asserts that Mr. Labrum falls within the
group targeted by the legislature for application of the gang
enhancement, criminal street gang members, and thus lacks
standing to assert that the enhancement is being applied to
persons for whom it was not intended.

However, the State has no

reliable evidence upon which to base such a conclusion.
The State relies on statements in the presentence
investigation report, R. 628 at p. 3, for its assertion that Mr.
15

Labrum is a criminal street gang member.
the "Official Version . . .

The PSI indicates that

is taken from reports of the Salt

Lake City Police Department."

Id.

It does not indicate who

wrote those police reports, or where the information was gathered
from.
This is precisely the type of information that the
Supreme Court held to be insufficiently reliable to form the
basis of a sentence in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah
1993) :
In our view, the ISAT report does not rise to
minimum standards of reliability. The report consists
solely of double, and even triple, hearsay. For
example, the ISAT report, which is itself hearsay,
summarizes the statements made by the niece during the
interviews. The report then relates a summary of the
mother's description to the ISAT interviewer of
statements made by the niece. Although hearsay
evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding,
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents
such a high probability for inaccuracy that it cannot
stand alone as the basis for sentencing.
State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993).
So here, the evidence of gang affiliation is at least
double hearsay.

Someone reported the information to a police

officer (hearsay), who put it in a report (hearsay), which was
read by the presentence investigator, and reported (hearsay) in
the PSI.

This information is double and triple hearsay, and "is

so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for
sentencing."

Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071.

Because the State does not have reliable evidence
establishing that Mr. Labrum falls within the targeted group for
16

application of the gang enhancement, he has standing to pursue
his claims.

B.

APPELLANT HAS CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THE
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE.

Reference to legislative history is necessary and
appropriate in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute that
is at odds with its legislative intent.
statute is silent with respect to intent.

The gang enhancement
That silence, together

with the nature of appellant's constitutional attack against the
statute, compels review of legislative history to assess whether
the statute accomplishes its legislative purposes and objectives
in a reasonable manner.
Courts traditionally review the legislative history of
statutes challenged on vagueness and due process grounds, since
the statute must rationally relate to legislative intent.

See

United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First
Amendment v. F.C.C., 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991).

The

statute has to be construed in accordance with legislative
intent:
The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in
regard to the interpretation and application of a statute
is: What was the intent of the legislature?" All other
rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it and
are helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining that
objective. In determining that intent the statute should be
considered in the light of the purpose it was designed to
serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if that
can be done consistent with its language.
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Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966)
(footnote and cites omitted); accord Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); Cullum v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange. 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993); Am. Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("This Court's primary
responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature"); Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846, 847
(Utah 1967) (primary objective concerning statute is to discover
.intent and purpose for enactment).
Indeed, the literal language of a statute must give way
to the unequivocally expressed intent of the legislature:
["0]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is
that the statute should be looked at as a whole and in light
of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and should
be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that
objective. In order to give the statute the implementation
which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention
sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness. ["]
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974
(1965).
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987).

Accord

Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah
1996) ("we will interpret a statute according to its plain
language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused,
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of
the statute").

Here, the plain language of the gang enhancement

is "in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the
statute," see Legislative History attached as Appendix B to
opening brief, and must yield.
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In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892), the United States Supreme Court held:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.
This has been often asserted, and the Reports are full of
cases illustrating its application. This is not the
substitution of the will of the judge for that of the
legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used
in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation,
or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning
to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act.
The Supreme Court was interpreting a statute which read:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership,
or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the
transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the
importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any
foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its
territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or
agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made
previous to the importation or migration of such alien or
aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service
of any kind in the United States, its territories, or the
District of Columbia.
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.

Despite the plain

language of the statute, the Court held it inapplicable to the
church, which had arranged for the transport of an Englishman to
serve as rector and pastor at a church in New York City.

The

legislative history made clear that "the intent of congress was
simply to stay the influx of [] cheap, unskilled labor."

Id. at

465; accord. United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
242 (1989); Nat'l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R. R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (basic principles of
statutory construction yield to contrary evidence of legislative
19

intent); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534
(1940) :
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one
'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole'[] this Court has followed that purpose, rather than
the literal words." When aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its
use,[] however clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination. ' [3
Id. at 543-44 (footnotes and cites omitted); Harrison v. Northern
Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (there is no rule of law
forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter
how clear the words); see also Burlington Northern R. Co. v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United States v.
Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) (regard for the
specific history of the legislative process affords more solid
ground for giving it meaning).

Appellant's reliance on

legislative history is appropriate and necessary for evaluating
whether statutory objectives are reasonably and rationally served
by the statute enacted.

Here, the legislative purpose of

targeting only criminal street gang members is not reasonably and
rationally served by the statute, rendering the statute
unconstitutional.

POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS VOID FOR
VAGUENESS.
(Responding to State's brief at Point IV, pp. 3037)
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The State's argument concerning appellant's due process
vagueness claim is premised on the State's misreading of the
legislative intent.

See Point III, supra, for discussion of why

this Court must look to the legislative history to determine
legislative intent.

Because the statute was intended to apply

only to criminal street gang members, and because the legislature
has relied on the unguided discretion of judges to apply it only
to criminal street gang members, it is void for vagueness.
•

*

*

Mr. Labrum relies on his opening brief in response to
those portions of the State's brief not expressly addressed here.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and his opening brief, Mr.
Labrum respectfully requests that the gang enhancement imposed
against him be vacated for insufficient evidence.

Alternatively,

the enhancement should be vacated because the statute is
yi

unconstitutional.
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APPENDIX A
Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Form 4

1309

UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES

Appx. D

Time Matrix — Form 4.
The time matrix is used to calculate the minimum time if the offender is
sentenced to prison or jail (not as a condition of probation). If there is only one
active sentence, the guideline minimum term is determined by simply identifying the cell where the crime severity of the conviction offense intersects
with the criminal history category.
If there is more than one active sentence, the first step is to identify the
most serious offense (the one that carries the sentence with the most time to
serve remaining). This crime should be intersected with the proper category of
criminal history (most current calculation).
Consecutive or concurrent
Other sentences should be examined to determine if they are, or should be,
consecutive or concurrent. The guidelines as to when a sentence should be consecutive appear in the bottom left hand corner of the page. The guideline enhancement for consecutive and concurrent sentences appears in the two rows just
below the time matrix. These enhancements should all be added together to arrive at the guideline total sentence.
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